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PERCEPTIONS OF DEVIANCE AND ITS 
CURES IN THE LAWYER REINSTATEMENT 
PROCESS 
Bruce Green* & Jane Campbell Moriarty**† 
ABSTRACT 
State courts’ approach to lawyer admissions and discipline has not 
changed fundamentally in the past century.  Courts still place faith in 
the idea that “moral character” is a stable trait that reliably predicts 
whether an individual will be honest in any given situation.  Although 
research in neuroscience, cognitive science, psychiatry, research 
psychology, and behavioral economics (collectively “cognitive and 
social science”) has influenced prevailing concepts of personality and 
trustworthiness, courts to date have not considered whether they 
might change or refine their approach to “moral character” in light of 
scientific insights.  This Article examines whether courts should 
reevaluate how they decide whether to allow lawyers to return to law 
practice after suspension or disbarment for impermissibly deceptive 
conduct.  The Article describes courts’ traditional approach, discusses 
some of the relevant scientific literature, and suggests some possible 
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This Article references various social and cognitive science articles and books.  
Neuroscience, cognitive science, research psychology, and behavioral economics all 
contribute to current understandings about personality and behavior.  While we are 
not experts in any of these fields, we believe that insights from those disciplines, 
based upon widely-cited, peer-reviewed publications, might be valuable to explain 
lawyers’ deviance and its possible cures.  Any errors, of course, are the authors’ 
alone. 
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reasons why courts appear not to have considered such scientific 
insights.  The Article concludes with some thoughts about the utility 
of the role of scientific research in the disciplinary process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the conference on Julius Henry Cohen’s book, The Law: 
Business or Profession?, the authors of this Article began a discussion 
about lawyers who commit serious wrongdoing resulting in 
suspension or disbarment.  Many of those lawyers sought readmission 
at some later point and we wondered whether those lawyers were 
demonstrably better people by the time they sought readmission to 
the practice.  
We were particularly interested in those lawyers who engaged in 
serious deceit: impulsively stealing clients’ money, swindling people in 
investment schemes, or profoundly deceiving clients about 
fundamental aspects of cases (such as whether a complaint was even 
filed).  We did not focus on lawyers suffering from disabling 
depression or wrestling with a substance disorder that may have 
explained their misbehavior, but on those whose deceptive behavior 
was not readily explicable, perhaps not even to themselves. 
Our first inquiry was why lawyers jeopardized their livelihoods by 
engaging in serious dishonesty.  Were these bad-acting lawyers always 
corrupt, or was their dishonesty anomalous?  The research led us to 
consider whether honesty is a relatively stable personality trait, as 
many presume, or whether generally honest individuals are capable of 
serious dishonesty.  We also wondered how courts decide whether 
lawyers suspended or disbarred for dishonest acts are worthy to 
return to practice.  We were not confident that courts had a solid grip 
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on either why people committed such deceptive acts or whether they 
were reformed.  These conversations were the antecedents for this 
Article, which was prepared in connection with a conference on Julius 
Henry Cohen’s 1916 book, The Law: Business or Profession? 
Cohen’s book provides a window into how courts, assisted by bar 
associations, handled misconduct and discipline in the early twentieth 
century.  It turns out that nearly one hundred years later, despite 
remarkable advances in all aspects of cognitive and social science, 
courts proceed much the way they did in Cohen’s day—they rely on 
aphorisms and intuition to decide whether lawyers are ethically fit to 
practice. 
In this Article, we examine the process of suspension, disbarment, 
and readmission in light of some twentieth and twenty-first century 
scientific knowledge.  We begin by looking at professional discipline a 
century ago, during Cohen’s time.  Joining the chorus of those who 
question “character” as immutable and predictable, we then consider 
more contemporary cases in which courts decide that lawyers are 
sufficiently rehabilitated and investigate how courts make such 
decisions.  Focusing on the concept of deception, we sketch out some 
of the insights that cognitive and social sciences offer on the subject.  
We ask whether science may illuminate the problems of 
understanding, predicting, and preventing deceptive behavior.  
Finally, we discuss possible reasons why courts have eschewed help 
from those outside the legal profession to understand deceptive 
behavior, choosing instead to carry on as they have done for over a 
century.  Our modest proposal is that in keeping with twenty-first 
century thought, a useful first step might be to systematically collect 
and analyze data on a large-scale basis to find out what happens to 
lawyers who are reinstated after disbarment or suspension.  
I.  A CENTURY OF PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE: DEVIANCE AND 
REHABILITATION  
Writing almost a century ago from his perspective as a leader of the 
New York bar, Julius Henry Cohen depicted the attorney disciplinary 
process as playing a central role in how the legal profession justifies 
and defines itself.  Cohen opened his 1916 book, The Law: Business 
or Profession?,1 with a chapter titled “Disbarment,” setting forth his 
view, which he illustrated by describing the attorney disciplinary 
process in New York City and summarizing cases in which lawyers 
 
 1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916). 
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were sanctioned for misconduct.  Cohen touted the collaboration of 
“the Bench and Bar” in the process.2 
Cohen envisioned a reciprocal relationship between 
professionalism and discipline.  On the one hand, to maintain the 
practice of law as a profession, it was essential to have professional 
regulation.  The profession must enunciate high standards of conduct 
for the public’s protection and “purge” itself “of those who fall below 
the standards.”3  On the other hand, a robust, well-functioning 
disciplinary process required lawyers’ willing participation, which 
would not be forthcoming absent a sense of commitment to the law as 
a profession.  Cohen warned: “Take away the conception of the 
practice of law as a profession—make it a business—and at once you 
destroy the very basis of professional discipline.”4 
Cohen was describing the formal disciplinary process in its infancy, 
coinciding with the rise of bar associations.5  State courts had 
exercised authority to admit lawyers to practice, announced standards 
of conduct, and disbarred or otherwise sanctioned lawyers for 
violating those standards.6  Although courts had limited resources to 
devote to the disciplinary role, informal regulation within small, 
 
 2. Id. at 23 (“The community is interested—vitally interested in knowing that 
wrongdoing on the part of its lawyers is more readily ascertained and more quickly 
punished than any other wrongdoing in the community.”). 
 3. Id. at 22–23. 
 4. Id. 
 5. New York City’s Association of the Bar was founded in 1870. See About the 
New York City Bar Association, N.Y.C. B. ASS’N, http://www.nycbar.org/about-
us/overview-about-us (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  Other bar associations arose around 
the same time.  The New York State Bar Association was founded in 1877. See N.Y. 
ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.nysba.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  The American Bar 
Association was founded in Saratoga, New York, in 1878. See History of the 
American Bar Association, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/utility/ 
about_the_aba/history.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  And the Rochester Bar 
Association (now the Monroe County Bar Association) was founded in 1892. See 
About the Monroe County Bar Association, MONROE COUNTY B. ASS’N, 
http://www.mcba.org/AboutUs/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  The New York County 
Lawyers’ Association, in which Cohen became a leading figure, was founded in 1908 
in response to other bar associations’ exclusionary policies.  By the 1890s, New York 
courts began to turn to local bar associations to initiate and prosecute disciplinary 
proceedings. See, e.g., Matter of Dorthy, 44 N.E. 1123 (N.Y. 1896) (disciplinary 
prosecution by the Rochester Bar Association); In re Mashbir, 45 N.Y.S. 1144 (App. 
Div. 1897) (disciplinary prosecution by the Association of the Bar). 
 6. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation 
of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 73 (2009).  Criminal prosecutors have also served a 
regulatory role in situations where lawyers’ misconduct crossed criminal lines. See 
generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 327 (1998). 
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homogenous local bars may have helped fill the gap until immigration 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the growth 
of elite urban bars.   
Courts began to delegate disciplinary authority to state and local 
bar associations.  For example, New York’s intermediate appellate 
court authorized the Grievance Committee of New York City’s 
Association of the Bar to investigate and prosecute New York City 
lawyers and conduct disciplinary hearings, subject to that court’s 
review.7  Participating lawyers volunteered time and bar associations 
contributed the operating costs.8  These efforts gave Cohen and 
others reason to claim pride in the law as a self-regulating profession. 
The contemporary disciplinary process directly descended from the 
one Cohen described and his contemporaries would recognize it.9  
The process still exists to adjudicate claims of lawyer misconduct and 
impose sanctions ranging from censure or suspension to disbarment 
for misconduct.  The objective remains largely to purge the profession 
of those who cannot be trusted to uphold the professional standards 
in the future.  The need for good decisions about misbehaving lawyers 
has never been more important.  Complaints against lawyers for 
ethical violations continue unabated and surveys among lawyers 
themselves suggest perhaps a greater willingness to engage in forms 
of deceptive practice.10 
Although the organized bar’s role has been eliminated in many 
states, lawyers still dominate the process.  In New York, for example, 
disciplinary prosecutions are now conducted by full-time staff lawyers 
functioning as an arm of the state intermediate appellate court, but 
volunteer lawyers still review evidence and make recommendations.  
 
 7. See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY 
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1870-1970, at 351–71 
(1970).  For a discussion of a disciplinary proceeding from Cohen’s era, see Bruce A. 
Green, Criminal Defense Lawyering at the Edge: A Look Back, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
353, 375–86 (2007). 
 8. COHEN, supra note 1, at 4–5, 20–21. 
 9. For a discussion of the evolution of lawyer disciplinary systems, see Mary 
Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911 (1994).  Among the many insightful studies of the 
contemporary disciplinary process are: RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: 
LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008) [hereinafter ABEL, 
LAWYERS IN THE DOCK]; RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL (2010) [hereinafter 
ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL]; Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales 
About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1 
(1998). 
 10. See Professor Ross’s survey data on lawyers’ willingness and acceptance of bill 
padding, discussed infra at note 84. 
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In the federal district courts of New York, the bar takes a greater 
role: volunteer lawyers are appointed on an ad hoc basis to serve as 
disciplinary prosecutors.  Lawyers do not have exclusive authority to 
regulate themselves, but they may still stake a claim to be members of 
a substantially “self-regulating” profession.11 
One might expect that over the period ranging from Cohen’s time 
to the present, courts would have developed an increasingly 
sophisticated understanding of lawyer deviance, not only from 
deciding many cases, but from following developments outside the 
field of attorney discipline.  But in fact, how courts decide which 
sanctioned lawyers should be allowed to resume the practice of law 
has not significantly evolved over the past century.   
When deciding whether to admit applicants to the bar, state 
judiciaries insist that successful applicants must possess good moral 
character, and the question of character returns to center stage once a 
suspended or disbarred lawyer seeks to return to practice.  In this 
respect, courts’ decision-making about discipline and reinstatement 
remains virtually unchanged from their approach a century ago 
during the time of Julius Henry Cohen.  Focusing on fairly 
predictable factors such as remorse and claims of rehabilitation, 
judges make seemingly intuitive decisions about whether a 
candidate’s “good character” has been restored.  Courts assume that 
a lawyer’s “character” determines and predicts her behavior in both 
her personal and professional life; that a lawyer’s character is 
relatively constant but that some who engage in misconduct because 
of deficient character can later be rehabilitated (i.e., they can change 
and improve their character); and finally, that courts can differentiate 
between the changed and the unchanged.  Although science has 
progressed in explaining behavior in the intervening century, courts 
have made virtually no use of insights from other disciplines in 
structuring their disciplinary decision-making. 
In light of the wealth of information about human behavior that 
has developed since Cohen’s time, we explore whether scientific 
insights can be useful to courts in the reinstatement process.  We 
narrow our inquiry to lawyers who were sanctioned for conduct 
involving deception, a recurring subject in disciplinary proceedings.  
Drawing on social and cognitive science, we note that contrary to 
courts’ oft-stated beliefs, deceptive behaviors—at least at low levels—
 
 11. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1147 (2009). 
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are more widespread than believed.  Although only a small 
percentage of people are consistently and dangerously dishonest, 
most people are dishonest to some degree.12   
As Deborah Rhode’s seminal work on character in the admissions 
and disciplinary processes would suggest,13 the idea that lawyers have 
a consistent and honest “character” is essentially flawed.  We believe 
that courts’ predictions about whether readmitted lawyers will 
reoffend are based on little more than guesswork.  While cognitive 
and social science insights may not make these predictions much 
easier, they may offer ways to understand and curb dishonest 
behavior in the profession generally and in readmitted lawyers 
specifically.   
II.  THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM: ASSUMPTIONS, 
OBJECTIVES, AND DECISION-MAKING 
The courts’ stated objectives in disciplining lawyers have remained 
constant since Cohen’s day:14 to protect clients, courts, and the public 
from lawyers who cannot be trusted to abide by professional 
standards in the future.15  Disciplinary sanctions are not expressly 
intended to be punitive or to serve as a deterrent, although in reality 
those may often be courts’ principal objectives in imposing them.   
An evaluation of the lawyer’s present “character” often serves as a 
proxy for a prediction about whether the lawyer in question will 
transgress again in the future.16  The determination mirrors one made 
in the admissions process, which weeds out candidates (in small 
numbers) whose prior behavior suggests that they are likely to engage 
in professional misconduct.17  As the principal goal of the disciplinary 
 
 12. See discussion infra in Part III: “Cognitive and Social Science Insights into 
Lawyer Dishonesty.” 
 13. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 
YALE L.J. 491 (1985). 
 14. Lawyer discipline may serve additional, unarticulated objectives. See 
generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 675 (2003). 
 15. COHEN, supra note 1, at 4 (“It is our duty to . . . protect the State and the 
public from lawyers who prostitute the authority given to them for personal gain by 
imposing on or defrauding their clients or the tribunals which are instituted to 
administer the law and protect those whose rights and interests are committed to 
their care.” (quoting Matter of Flannery, 135 N.Y.S. 612, 614 (App. Div. 1912)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 16. See, e.g., D.C. Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146, 147 (D.C. 1975). 
 17. See, e.g., Matter of Wiesner, 943 N.Y.S.2d 410 (App. Div. 2012).  In Cohen’s 
day, lawyers were instructed to “aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the 
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function is to prevent harm rather than punish misconduct, courts 
often suspend or disbar lawyers even for misconduct committed 
outside their professional role, including for criminal or dishonest acts 
in their personal dealings.18  Courts believe that personal wrongdoing 
denotes a dishonest or law-breaking character that will equally 
influence the lawyer’s professional conduct. 
Courts assume that individuals possess either good (e.g., honest or 
law-abiding) character or bad character, and that character is a 
general predictor of future conduct.  Thus, those with dishonest 
character, even in their personal lives, are more likely to act 
dishonestly in professional dealings.  Courts envision good character 
to be an essential element in regulating the profession and protecting 
the public.19 
 
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral 
character or education.” ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 29 (1908) (quoted 
in COHEN, supra note 1, at 331).  The seminal work on the use of “moral character” 
in the attorney licensing process in the United States is Rhode, supra note 13.  For a 
history of the use of “moral character” in this process, see Carol M. Langford, 
Barbarians at the Bar: Regulation of the Legal Profession Through the Admissions 
Process, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1193, 1196–1208 (2008).  For a discussion of the role of 
“character” in Canada’s admissions process, see Alice Woolley, Tending the Bar: The 
“Good Character” Requirement for Law Society Admission, 30 DALHOUSIE L.J. 27 
(2007).  For additional commentary, see Aaron M. Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights: 
Understanding the “Good Moral Character” Examination for Bar Applicants, 40 
AKRON L. REV. 255 (2007); Matthew A. Ritter, The Ethics of Moral Character 
Determination: An Indeterminate Ethical Reflection Upon Bar Admissions, 39 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 1 (2002); Keith Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession’s 
Good Moral Character, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1037 (2008); Richard R. Arnold, Jr., 
Comment, Presumptive Disqualification and Prior Unlawful Conduct: The Danger of 
Unpredictable Character Standards for Bar Applicants, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 63, 99; 
Maureen M. Carr, Note, The Effect of Prior Criminal Conduct on the Admission to 
Practice Law: The Move to More Flexible Admission Standards, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 367, 384–85 (1995); Marcus Ratcliff, Note, The Good Character 
Requirement: A Proposal for a Uniform National Standard, 36 TULSA L.J. 487 
(2000). 
 18. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592, 597–98 (1874) (“[W]hen an attorney 
commits an act, whether in the discharge of his duties as attorney or not, showing 
such a want of personal or professional honesty as renders him unworthy of public 
confidence, it is not only the province but the duty of the court, upon a proper and 
legitimate presentation of the case, to strike his name from the roll of attorneys. . . .  
He has by his own misconduct divested himself of qualifications that were 
indispensable to the practice of his profession; and while he may regard the judgment 
depriving him of that right as a punishment for the offense, the action of the court is 
based alone upon the ground of public policy and for the public good.”). 
 19. Rhode, supra note 13, at 507–08.  While decisions concerning admission and 
readmission differ in various ways, we believe that there is substantial overlap in 
decision-making in both categories. 
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We question these assumptions.  As Professor Rhode and other 
scholars explain, character is an amorphous concept and courts’ 
decisions about it lack uniformity.20  The Supreme Court has similarly 
commented on the difficulty of defining character, noting that the 
term is “unusually ambiguous” and “can be defined in an almost 
unlimited number of ways for any definition that will necessarily 
reflect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer.”21  
Historically, the use of character as a requirement for admission to 
the bar has implicated issues of status, social class, race, and gender.22  
Professor Rhode illustrates the problem with reference to the first 
National Bar Examiners Conference in 1933, at which it was noted 
that “sometimes you have wonderful character evidence displayed 
even though the applicant is not well educated or his parents were 
born in Russia.”23  At times, character has been a thinly veiled 
justification to limit the admission of immigrant groups, women, 
minorities, or those who belonged to unpopular political groups, such 
as the communist party.24  Finally, even if we are able to agree on a 
definition of character, there is little reason to believe that good or 
bad character is either consistent or predictable in most given 
individuals.25 
If one were to accept the significance of “character” as a consistent 
state, a rational approach to discipline would be permanently to 
disbar every lawyer who is found to have engaged in serious 
misconduct, on the theory that the lawyer probably lacks the requisite 
character to practice law and the lawyer’s character is unlikely to 
change.  Most courts have not adopted this approach, presumably 
 
 20. Id. at 529–32; see also Ritter, supra note 17, at 11 (commenting that the 
criteria for “moral fitness to practice law . . . has remained notably indeterminate”). 
 21. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957). 
 22. See Rhode, supra note 13, at 499–503. 
 23. Id. at 500–01 (citing Character Examination of Candidates, 1 B. EXAMINER 63, 
72 (1932) (quoting George H. Smith)).  Pertinent to our discussion, researchers at the 
University of California, Berkeley and the University of Toronto found a strong 
correlation between social class and unethical behavior.  Contrary to the suggestions 
from the early twentieth century, the relationship correlates higher social class with 
unethical behavior. See Paul K. Piff et al., Higher Social Class Predicts Increased 
Unethical Behavior, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4086, 4088 (2012), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/11/4086.full.pdf (concluding that the pursuit of self-
interest, which is a fundamental motive among the elite in society, is associated with 
increased desire for wealth and status, which can promote wrongdoing). 
 24. Accord Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 267; Rhode, supra note 13, at 499–503; 
Swisher, supra note 17, at 1040–44. 
 25. See Rhode, supra note 13, at 559 (“The situational nature of moral conduct 
makes predictions of behavior uncertain under any circumstances . . . .”). 
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considering it too harsh,26 although a handful of states have adopted 
permanent disbarment rules that prohibit the disbarred lawyer from 
ever seeking readmission.27  Most states permit reinstatement after 
disbarment, which generally results in a lengthy suspension rather 
than permanent banishment from the practice.  In those states, the 
courts attempt to strike a balance between protecting the public from 
“bad” lawyers—i.e., those who are likely to re-offend—and the 
interest in readmitting those for whom past misconduct was 
aberrational. 
This leads to the challenge at the heart of professional regulation: 
how can courts or their surrogates predict which individuals who 
offend are likely or unlikely to re-offend?  In the disciplinary process, 
this question might be raised at either of two stages.  It might be 
raised when the lawyer is initially sanctioned for misconduct, but is 
more likely raised when she seeks reinstatement or readmission.28  
Most states require lawyers who have been suspended for a 
significant period to prove they have the requisite character to 
practice law.29  Likewise, in most states, lawyers who are disbarred are 
not permanently excluded from the profession but after a substantial 
period of time may seek readmission.30  In either case, the sanctioned 
individual will have the burden of proving he or she has been 
 
 26. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted in a reinstatement 
proceeding, “[a] fundamental precept of our system is that persons can be 
rehabilitated. . . .  [That] redemption is possible and valuable is both well established 
in law and premised upon long-standing, even ancient traditions.” In re Ellis, 930 
N.E.2d 724, 726 (Mass. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. For a more detailed discussion of permanent disbarment, see Brian 
Finkelstein, Comment, Should Permanent Disbarment Be Permanent?, 20 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 587, 590–91 (2007). See also James R. Zazzali, The Whys and Hows of 
Permanent Disbarment: New Jersey’s Wilson Rule, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311, 
337 n.224 (2008) (listing states that have permanent disbarment rules). 
 28. For a collection of decisions on reinstatement and readmission, see generally 
M. C. Dransfield, Reinstatement of Attorney After Disbarment, Suspension or 
Resignation, 70 A.L.R.2d 268 (1960). 
 29. See ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROF’L SANCTIONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING 
LAWYER SANCTIONS B.2.3, B.2.10 (2005).  The result is that, in reality, the length of 
suspension tends to be significantly longer than the period of suspension established 
by the court.  Many suspended lawyers wait longer than required to appear for 
reinstatement, and the period of time required successfully to navigate the 
reinstatement process adds additional time. See generally Brian K. Pinaire et al., 
“Philadelphia Lawyers”: Policing the Law in Pennsylvania, 2012 ABA J. PROF. LAW. 
137. 
 30. See ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROF’L SANCTIONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING 
LAWYER SANCTIONS B.2.2, B.2.10 (2005). 
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rehabilitated.31  Thus, courts have opportunities to make predictions 
about lawyers’ future conduct and could develop data about whether 
their predictions prove correct and what considerations predict future 
disciplinary misconduct.  If they chose to, courts could learn from the 
data. 
In fact, courts do not make predictions about sanctioned lawyers’ 
future conduct as often as one might expect.  At the initial 
sanctioning stage, courts often avoid the question of whether the 
lawyer is likely to re-offend, because an appropriate sanction can be 
determined without regard to this question.  The disciplinary process 
serves secondary purposes, aside from public protection, such as to 
identify and condemn conduct by lawyers that transgresses the 
profession’s norms.32  Consequently, lawyers may be sanctioned for 
misconduct without regard to the likelihood that they will engage in 
future misconduct.  When a lawyer engages in egregious misconduct, 
the court may disbar the lawyer simply to express the extent of the 
court’s disapproval or to ensure public confidence in the legal 
profession.  Administrative and proportionality considerations may 
also allow courts to avoid delving into lawyers’ propensity to re-
offend.  If the lawyer’s wrongdoing was merely technical, 
unintentional, or in an area of legal ambiguity, the court may impose 
a trivial sanction in the belief that the misconduct was so minor that 
there is no reason to question the lawyer’s character and that 
suspension or disbarment would, in any case, be excessive.33 
 
 31. See, e.g., In re Lord, 910 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. 2006) (“Petitioner has . . . [the] burden 
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that his resumption of the practice of law 
at this time would not have a detrimental impact on the integrity and standing of the 
bar, the administration of justice or the public interest, and that he has the moral 
qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission to practice 
law.”). See generally Kimberly A. Lacey, Note, Second Chances: The Procedure, 
Principles, and Problems with Reinstatement of Attorneys After Disbarment, 14 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1117 (2001).  As both a legal and practical matter, the burden 
is probably higher on those seeking readmission after disbarment than those seeking 
reinstatement after suspension. See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L 
CONDUCT 101:3012 (citing In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d 297, 300 (S.D. 1997) (“[A] court 
should be slow to disbar, but it should be even slower to [readmit] . . . .”)). 
 32. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 4 (“It is our duty to condemn conduct that tends 
to impair or defeat the administration of justice or degrade the usefulness of the 
profession.”). 
 33. The professional conduct rules might be read as reflecting an assumption that 
certain misconduct, by its nature, has no bearing on a lawyer’s character.  Lawyers 
must generally report non-confidential knowledge of another lawyer’s disciplinary 
violation, but only if the misconduct “raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” ABA MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2012). 
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Even when the lawyer’s propensity to commit future misconduct 
seems to be important, the court may impose a sanction allowing it to 
bypass the question of character.  Suspending the lawyer has the 
practical effect of requiring that individual to demonstrate the 
requisite character as a condition of reinstatement.  In New York, for 
example, any lawyer suspended for longer than six months must apply 
for reinstatement, as would be true of a disbarred lawyer seeking to 
practice law.34  The lawyer is placed in professional purgatory but is 
not cast out of the profession permanently.  The suspension might be 
read as an expression of agnosticism about the lawyer’s character, 
which is in part why a lawyer concerned about his reputation would 
much prefer it to disbarment.  The court need not express a judgment 
about the lawyer’s character and propensity to engage in future 
misconduct unless and until the lawyer seeks reinstatement.  
Presumably, many lawyers who were suspended for significant 
periods or disbarred never seek to regain their law licenses because, 
for example, they have moved on to other pursuits, doubt that they 
could resume law practice successfully, or think it unlikely that they 
can make a compelling application. 
Because courts may avoid or defer character determinations, their 
disciplinary decisions can be ambiguous as to whether the court is 
predicting that the lawyer in question will re-offend.  A lengthy 
suspension or disbarment may reflect a judgment that the lawyer 
poses a future risk of professional misconduct, but these sanctions 
may simply reflect a decision that harsh punishment is necessary for 
other reasons, or that the character determination is best left 
unresolved.  On the other hand, courts sometimes do make character 
judgments, if only implicitly.  A censure or a short suspension for 
misconduct that could have merited a more serious sanction 
presupposes that the court regarded the misconduct as aberrational. 
This practice was as true in Cohen’s day as today.  In addition to 
describing instances in which lawyers were disbarred or suspended 
because of serious misconduct committed either within or outside the 
practice of law,35 Cohen described two instances in which lawyers 
were merely censured for significant misconduct,36 apparently based 
 
 34. See, e.g., 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.14(3) (2012). 
 35. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 36. Cohen discusses Matter of Lauterbach, 155 N.Y.S. 478 (App. Div. 1915), 
which involved a senior commercial lawyer, once a candidate for national office, who 
was censured. COHEN, supra note 1, at 5; see also id. at 21 (discussing lawyer who was 
ordered to cease practicing law unless he repaid money wrongly obtained from a 
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on judgments that the individuals in question were unlikely to offend 
again.  Not surprisingly, it appears that both lawyers treated 
sympathetically by the disciplinary authorities (and Cohen) were 
members of the professional elite. 
In contrast, at the reinstatement or readmission stage of the 
disciplinary process, it would seem more difficult to dodge the 
question of the applicant’s “character” or likely future conduct.  
Conventionally, the individual seeking to resume the practice of law 
must demonstrate “rehabilitation”37—that is, that the character flaws 
that led to prior misconduct have now been corrected.38  Underlying 
this requirement are the assumptions that at least some individuals’ 
characters are mutable and that the courts are capable of discerning 
those whose character has improved. 
Even in the post-sanction process, courts may avoid predicting 
whether the applicant can be relied on to follow the rules.  The court 
may deny a motion for reinstatement or readmission for reasons 
independent of the applicant’s propensity to commit misconduct.  The 
prior misconduct may have been so egregious that public respect for 
the profession would be diminished by restoring the lawyer’s license 
even if the court itself was confident in the lawyer’s rehabilitation.39  It 
may also be that the possibility of recidivism, however small, may be 
unacceptable because the court and the profession would be 
embarrassed if the readmitted lawyer re-offended.  But in this 
context, courts cannot systematically avoid making judgments.  
Especially when suspended lawyers seek reinstatement, courts, 
 
client, and who was then loaned the money to make the repayment by a lawyer 
engaged in the disciplinary process). 
 37. See, e.g., In re Wigoda, 395 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ill. 1979) (“Rehabilitation, the 
most important consideration in reinstatement proceedings, is a matter of one’s 
‘return’ to a beneficial, constructive and trustworthy role.”). 
 38. At least in theory, an alternative approach might be to seek to convince the 
court that prior misconduct was an aberration—i.e., that the lawyer has possessed 
good character all along.  This is unpromising for several reasons, including that 
courts presume that serious misconduct is an expression of bad character.  Courts 
may dismiss applicants as lacking necessary candor or insight if they say that they 
have always possessed good character and have no explanation for their aberrational 
bad acts.  Further, lawyers cannot ‘plead in the alternative.’  As discussed below, full 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing and contrition are considered preconditions of 
rehabilitation.  A claim that serious misconduct was simply an inexplicable aberration 
may be viewed as a minimization of one’s misconduct. 
 39. See, e.g., Hughes v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of 
Tenn., 259 S.W.3d 631 (Tenn. 2008) (denying readmission because of the nature of 
the prior misconduct, even though applicant had the requisite character to practice 
law). 
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having implicitly left the door open to the lawyer’s reinstatement, 
must sometimes decide whether the applicant now has the requisite 
character to practice law. 
Many courts do not seem to explicitly engage the question of the 
applicant’s likely future conduct; rather, they content themselves with 
determining whether the applicant has proven he is of current good 
moral character by considering his behavior since disbarment.40  It is 
possible that courts realize the complicated and often erroneous 
nature of predicting future behavior and choose to examine current 
known conduct instead.  However, as courts believe that the 
prediction of future behavior (such as dangerousness) is a subject 
appropriate for courtroom analysis,41 something else may be at issue 
here.   
It appears that courts consider proof of other factors—such as 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing and remorse—as evidence of 
improved character.42  And if character has improved, courts seem to 
assume—rightly or wrongly—that such good character will continue. 
One might expect courts to demand that sanctioned lawyers 
demonstrate insight into why they acted wrongfully in the past—e.g., 
why they took money from a client’s account, falsified a document, 
lied to a client or judge, committed a crime—and what has changed so 
 
 40. See, e.g., In re Reinstatement of Wiederholt, 24 P.3d 1219 (Alaska 2001) 
(determining that the disbarring conduct, the level of remorse and acknowledgment 
of wrongdoing, and amount of time passed since disbarment were all critical factors); 
see also In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1211, 1217 (D.C. 1985) (considering the following 
factors: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney 
was disciplined; (2) whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the 
misconduct; (3) the attorney’s conduct since discipline was imposed, including the 
steps taken to remedy past wrongs and prevent new ones; (4) the attorney’s present 
character; and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and competence to practice 
law”). 
Massachusetts uses a similar set of criteria: 
(1) the nature of the original offense for which the petitioner was disbarred; 
(2) the petitioner’s character, maturity, and experience at the time he was 
disbarred; (3) the petitioner’s occupation and conduct in the time since his 
disbarment; (4) the time elapsed since the disbarment; and (5) the 
petitioner’s present competence in legal skills. 
In re Ellis, 930 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Mass. 2010).  “This test allows the court to 
weigh the circumstances concerning the petitioner’s misconduct against his 
subsequent actions that show rehabilitation.” Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (finding the inability to control 
one’s dangerous behavior as grounds for civil commitment following criminal 
sentence for sexual violence); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (discussing 
future dangerousness in a death penalty hearing). 
 42. See sources cited supra note 40. 
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that they can be counted on not to do the same, or engage in other 
misconduct, in the future.43  But published opinions do not seem to 
emphasize this,44 and often do not seem to expect it.45   
In some cases, it may be clear why the lawyer has changed.  He 
may have had a substance abuse problem or a serious medical or 
psychiatric condition that has since been cured or controlled with 
treatment, allowing courts to believe he is essentially a changed 
person.46  In many cases, however, there will not be such a ready 
explanation for why the lawyer previously violated professional 
standards or why he can be trusted not to do so again.  What 
explanations will persuade the court?  The case law does not reveal 
any clear theory of how lawyers become rehabilitated.  Perhaps 
courts are unwilling to be too explicit for fear that they will be giving 
insincere lawyers a blueprint for how to regain admission.  But the 
 
 43. This requirement may be an important element in deciding that lawyers are 
again fit for the practice. Making individuals more self-aware (being called upon in 
public to account for one’s behavior, for example) can “heighten awareness of 
discrepancies between behavior and salient personal standards, creating pressure to 
act in accordance with standards.” C. Daniel Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy: 
Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
525, 529 (1999). 
 44. See In re Reinstatement of Wiederholt, 24 P.3d 1219 (Alaska 2001); See, e.g., 
In re Reinstatement of Grier, 737 A.2d 1076, 1084 (Md. 1999) (Raker, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing court’s reinstatement of lawyer, in part, because his responses to questions 
demonstrated “a lack of insight into the underlying problems that brought him to the 
attention of the Attorney Grievance Commission in the first place”). 
 45. See, In re Reinstatement of Grier, 737 A.2d at 1084 (Raker, J., dissenting); In 
re Reinstatement of Ramirez, 719 N.W.2d 920, 921 (Minn. 2006) (in determining 
whether to reinstate a disbarred lawyer, “the court considers proof of moral change, 
the attorney’s recognition of wrongful conduct, the length of time since the 
misconduct and disbarment, the seriousness of the original misconduct, the attorney’s 
physical or mental illness or pressures that are susceptible to correction, and the 
attorney’s intellectual competency to practice law”). But see In re Kerr, 675 A.2d 59, 
65 & n.1 (D.C. 1996) (noting that disbarred lawyer “sought to develop insight into 
her own psychology, so as to assure that the past transgressions are not repeated”). 
 46. See, e.g., Mullison v. People, 61 P.3d 504, 510 (Colo. 2002) (readmitting a 
disbarred lawyer whose professional misconduct was attributable to drug abuse upon 
finding that the applicant “ha[d] undergone a fundamental character change” by 
recovering from his drug addiction, engaging in community service, and 
acknowledging and expressing sincere remorse for his misconduct).  On the general 
problems of substance abuse and mental illness in the legal profession, see J. Nick 
Badgerow, Apocalypse at Law: The Four Horsemen of the Modern Bar—Drugs, 
Alcohol, Gambling and Depression, 18 PROF. LAW. 1, 2 (2007); Jon Bauer, The 
Character of the Questions and the Fitness of the Process: Mental Health, Bar 
Admissions and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 49 UCLA L. REV. 93 (2001); 
Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal Profession’s Willful 
and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589 
(2008). 
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professional literature and informal conversations with lawyers 
working in the disciplinary process also do not reveal any theory. 
Courts do identify two preconditions for rehabilitation: 
acknowledgement of the prior misconduct and remorse.47  There may 
be room for disagreement about whether the lawyer’s 
acknowledgment is sufficiently full, or whether the lawyer has 
understated the extent of his or her misconduct, its seriousness, or its 
consequences.  Likewise, there may be room for disagreement about 
whether expressions of contrition are sufficiently sincere.  Both of 
these preconditions call for subjective determinations. 
Courts also identify various types of circumstantial evidence from 
which they may infer that rehabilitation has occurred.  At minimum, 
the applicant must have refrained from misconduct during the period 
of suspension or disbarment.48  Literally “getting religion” may be 
viewed as an affirmative indication of reform.49  Good, charitable 
works during the period of suspension or disbarment are also among 
the indicia.  But a cynic might wonder how much weight these 
deserve.  “Character” may not be as unvarying as courts sometimes 
assume—e.g., one can abide by high personal standards but low 
 
 47. Compare Wiederholt, 24 P.3d at 1226 (denying a disbarred lawyer’s 
reinstatement, finding that lack of remorse, failure to accept responsibility, and 
minimization of prior misconduct made it likely that he would reoffend) with In re 
King, 868 P.2d 941, 943 (Ariz. 1994) (reinstating a suspended lawyer who “accepted 
absolute responsibility for his actions, and exhibited sincere remorse”). 
 48. See In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 1979) (denying a disbarred 
lawyer’s readmission where he “has not conducted himself in a manner to induce the 
confidence of this court in his professional morality. His conduct continues to be 
tainted by misrepresentations, flagrant disregard for the sanction of disbarment, and 
lack of appreciation for the ethical code governing attorneys.”).  A national study of 
state disciplinary processes published by the ABA in 1970 identified, among other 
deficiencies, undue liberality in readmitting disbarred lawyers.  The study highlighted 
the subjectivity of courts’ and disciplinary agencies’ approach to the question of 
rehabilitation.  For example, one bar president conceded that he did not know what 
rehabilitation meant in the disciplinary context, as distinguished from the theological 
context in which it “implied an acknowledgement of the commission of sin, a contrite 
heart, a true spirit of repentance,” and observed that “[a]s nearly as I can figure by 
our procedures, rehabilitation means that for some period of time following 
disbarment the man has not been in trouble.” ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION 
OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 153 (1970).   
 49. See Meiklejohn v. People, No. 10PDJ113, 2011 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 7, at *16 
(Colo. 2011); Lefly v. People, 167 P.3d 215, 218 (Colo. 2007).  Cohen envisioned 
professional regulation in similarly theological terms. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 1, 
at 23 (“[F]or sinning, the punishment is certain.”); id. at 42 (a lawyer “is a member of 
his profession” with “the unpleasant task of segregating his weak and sinning 
brothers from the rest of the community”). 
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professional ones.50  Moreover, even a formerly bad lawyer who wants 
to resume practicing could dedicate some time to joining a church or 
performing good works.  Courts rely on the testimony of reputable 
character witnesses as another indication.51  None of this says 
anything about differences in the mental processes of those who act 
wrongly and law-abidingly, how those processes can be transformed, 
and how one ascertains whether transformation has occurred. 
The dearth of discussion about why lawyers commit wrongdoing 
and how they can change reflects the basically intuitive and subjective 
nature of courts’ inquiry.  There is little effort to explain, for example, 
what kind of insight a lawyer is expected to have into his or her 
reasons for initially engaging in misconduct and how his or her 
thinking must change to prevent similar behavior in the future.  There 
is also little explanation of how courts can detect opportunists who 
engage in good works and other charitable endeavors, not for 
altruistic motivations, but simply to develop a record to present to the 
court.  Finally, courts do not appear to make efforts to collect or 
analyze data about recidivism by reinstated and readmitted lawyers.  
The result is that judges, or lawyers to whom courts delegate 
authority, appear to place significant weight on their untested moral 
intuitions. 
III.  COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS INTO LAWYER 
DISHONESTY 
While the contemporary disciplinary process has not changed 
fundamentally since Cohen’s day, the fund of scientific knowledge 
about behavior has increased significantly.  Courts have simply 
ignored the scientific developments in personality theory from the 
last century, choosing to cling to “good character” as its defining 
standard.52  We wonder how different the reinstatement and 
readmission processes might look if courts considered social and 
cognitive sciences.  In undertaking this inquiry, we focus on lawyer 
dishonesty rather than on all species of misconduct.  In exploring 
whether dishonesty is constant and predictable, we do not propose 
 
 50. See, e.g., In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1979) (“A person may, as 
Petitioner here, be well regarded by friends, refrain from smoking and drinking, 
participate in church activities, and yet lack a sense of professional rectitude.”). 
 51. See, e.g., In re Groshong, 413 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ill. 1980); Ex parte Marshall, 
147 So. 791, 792 (Miss. 1933); see also In re Johnston, 162 P.3d 922 (Okla. 2007); In re 
Stapleton, 880 A.2d 1213 (Pa. 2005). 
 52. See supra Part II. 
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sweeping and concrete reforms of the disciplinary process but simply 
explore the significance of its essential conservatism: might the courts 
be missing out on an opportunity to do better? 
If one hopes to focus on a particular wrongdoing or a particular 
trait, deception is a sensible place to start.  The concept is less vague 
and bias-laden than “bad character” and most of the decisions to 
disbar lawyers involve acts of deception: the lawyer steals or 
“borrows” money from a client without consent,53 secretly acts against 
the best interest of the client,54 lies about critical work alleged to be 
completed on the client’s behalf,55 takes advantage of a client in a 
deceptive manner,56 intentionally misleads a court,57 or commits a 
felony which by its nature includes some element of deception.58  
While some lawyers are suspended or disbarred solely for neglect of 
multiple matters due to substance abuse issues or depressive events, 
many of those cases involve the lawyer deceiving the client about the 
state of the cases.59 
 
 53. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Agiliga, 31 A.3d 103 (Md. 
2011) (disbarring attorney who commingled and appropriated client funds). 
 54. See, e.g., Orr v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 355 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. 2011) (attorney 
permanently disbarred after forging clients’ names to sell property, fabricating the 
names of people to whom he claimed to have sold property, lying about his actions, 
converting the money to pay personal debts, and misleading bar investigators). 
 55. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Shomber, 227 P.3d 157 (Okla. 2009) 
(attorney charged clients for work she never performed or performed in a grossly 
negligent matter, gave clients false information about the status of their cases, and 
never returned unearned fees). 
 56. See, e.g., In re Bark, 72 So. 3d 853 (La. 2011) (disbarment warranted when 
lawyer encouraged clients and others to invest in his fraudulent scheme). 
 57. See, e.g., In re Clark’s Case, 37 A.3d 327 (N.H. 2006) (disbarring an attorney 
for making a false statement in a bankruptcy filing on behalf of a client).  “The 
privilege of practicing law does not come without the concomitant responsibility of 
truth, candor, and honesty. Because no single transgression reflects more negatively 
on the legal profession than a lie, attorney misconduct involving dishonesty justifies 
disbarment.” Id. (quoting In re Young’s Case, 913 A.2d 727 (N.H. 2006)). 
 58. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Zaccagnini, 955 N.E.2d 977 (Ohio 2011) 
(disbarring attorney who was convicted of conspiring with partner to obtain more 
than twenty-one million dollars in commercial appraisal contracts). 
 59. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel, 950 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio 2011) 
(suspending an attorney for two years for failing to perform work, misrepresenting 
the status of work, and purchasing cocaine with fees); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. 
Beasley, 142 P.3d 410 (Okla. 2006) (suspending an alcoholic lawyer who took money 
and did not perform work, deceived clients about the state of their cases, did not 
communicate with clients, and failed to respond to bar inquiries). 
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Many cognitive and social scientists (as well as philosophers) claim, 
contrary to common understanding, that humans are very good liars.60  
And while most of us believe we are essentially honest and value 
honesty as a virtue,61 it turns out that nearly everyone lies frequently, 
spontaneously, and often unconsciously.62  Research consistently 
suggests that across various populations and professions, many people 
do cheat a little in fairly predictable ways—which would likely include 
all the lawyers with good character.63  Finally, while people are good 
liars, they do not seem to be good lie detectors: the average person’s 
ability to detect deception in a face-to-face interaction with another 
individual may be only modestly better than chance.64  That inability 
likely extends to judges deciding whether those seeking readmission 
have changed their ways. 
Deception is often separated into two categories: pro-social lies to 
maintain social norms, such as those designed to avoid awkwardness 
and unkindness;65 and self-oriented lies intended to benefit the liar: to 
increase his wealth or position, avoid punishment, or obtain some 
 
 60. See DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE LIE 
TO EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES (2012); DAVID LIVINGSTON SMITH, WHY 
WE LIE 12–13 (2004); ALDER VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT:  PITFALLS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2d ed. 2008); Daniel D. Langleben, & Jane C. Moriarty, Using 
Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law & Policy Collide, PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing studies); Sean A. Spence et al., A 
Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: Evidence from Functional 
Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B. 1755, 1755–62 (2004).  The length 
of this Article precludes an in-depth discussion of the deeper philosophical concepts 
of truth and dishonesty that undergird any exploration of the subject.  Rather, our 
focus is primarily on published experimental studies performed in the last several 
decades. 
 61. Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-
Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 633–34 (2008) (citing multiple 
studies about views of honesty). 
 62. See SMITH, supra note 60, at 15; VRIJ, supra note 60, at 22 (collecting studies 
on the frequency of lying and concluding that lying is a fact of everyday life and 
occurs frequently). 
 63. ARIELY, supra note 60, at 238 (“[A]ll of us are perfectly capable of cheating a 
little bit.”).  His study notes, however, that bankers cheated more than junior 
politicians—by a margin of two-to-one. Id. at 243. 
 64. Paul Eckman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 913, 913–20 (1991); accord VRIJ, supra note 60, at 141–88 (collecting 
and discussing studies about the accuracy rates of lay persons in detecting truth and 
deception).  There may be disagreement about whether these studies accurately 
match real-life decisions. See, e.g., Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, 
Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2567–71 (2008) (discussing studies). 
 65. As the late neuroscience researcher Sean Spence pointed out, “precisely 
truthful communication at all times would be difficult and perhaps rather brutal.” 
Spence et al., supra note 60, at 1756. 
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benefit.66  Deception is an ability that develops naturally during 
childhood and only individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders 
(e.g., autism) do not develop this ability,67 which suggests that 
deception may be an essential aspect of human functioning. 
The disciplinary system approaches the seriousness of and reasons 
for deception by focusing on the degree of harm to the victim or the 
profession.68  To date, to the best of our knowledge, no one has been 
disciplined for lying about one’s height in an online dating site69 or for 
other minor misrepresentations.  In the last few decades, the 
disciplinary system has declined to bring disciplinary charges against 
philandering lawyers—although this was not always the case.70 Some 
 
 66. VRIJ, supra note 60, at 19.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
however, collected dozens of reasons for lying: 
Saints may always tell the truth, but for mortals living means lying. We lie to 
protect our privacy (“No, I don't live around here”); to avoid hurt feelings 
(“Friday is my study night”); to make others feel better (“Gee you've gotten 
skinny”); to avoid recriminations (“I only lost $10 at poker”); to prevent 
grief (“The doc says you're getting better”); to maintain domestic 
tranquility (“She's just a friend”); to avoid social stigma (“I just haven't met 
the right woman”); for career advancement (“I'm sooo lucky to have a 
smart boss like you”); to avoid being lonely (“I love opera”); to eliminate a 
rival (“He has a boyfriend”); to achieve an objective (“But I love you so 
much”); to defeat an objective (“I'm allergic to latex”); to make an exit 
(“It's not you, it’s me”); to delay the inevitable (“The check is in the mail”); 
to communicate displeasure (“There's nothing wrong”); to get someone off 
your back (“I'll call you about lunch”); to escape a nudnik (“My mother's 
on the other line”); to namedrop (“We go way back”); to set up a surprise 
party (“I need help moving the piano”); to buy time (“I’m on my way”); to 
keep up appearances (“We're not talking divorce”); to avoid taking out the 
trash (“My back hurts”); to duck an obligation (“I've got a headache”); to 
maintain a public image (“I go to church every Sunday”); to make a point 
(“Ich bin ein Berliner”); to save face (“I had too much to drink”); to humor 
(“Correct as  usual, King Friday”); to avoid embarrassment (“That wasn't 
me”); to curry favor (“I've read all your books”); to get a clerkship (“You're 
the greatest living jurist”); to save a dollar (“I gave at the office”); or to 
maintain innocence (“There are eight tiny reindeer on the rooftop”). 
United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674–75 (9th Cir. 2011) 
 67. Spence et al., supra note 60, at 1755 (citing studies). 
 68. Again, this intuitive judgment may be misguided.  As small forms of deception 
are successful, the deceiver may be buoyed by the success and move to greater 
misdeeds. 
 69. People frequently lie by exaggerating their own physical attributes in 
matchmaking contexts. See Zoe Chance et al., Temporal View of the Costs and 
Benefits of Self-Deception, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15655, 15655 (2011) (citing 
studies). 
 70. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. of Hartford Cnty. Bar v. Broder, 152 A. 292 
(Conn. 1930) (disbarring attorney for adultery, which was then a felony).  Broder was 
convicted and sent to prison.  In deciding whether disbarment was appropriate, the 
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legal misrepresentations are also labeled acceptable forms of deceit, 
even by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which exclude 
certain deceptive statements related to settlement of a case.71 
On the other hand, many types of dishonesty are dealt with harshly 
in both the criminal and disciplinary systems.  When lawyers 
intentionally mislead the court72 or their clients,73 such conduct may 
result in severe penalties, including the loss of one’s license to 
practice.74 Misappropriating funds from clients is most often a 
disbarring offense and in some states will lead to permanent 
disbarment (colloquially termed a “professional death penalty”).75 
Dishonest acts culminating in a felony conviction may result in 
disbarment and convictions for perjury often result in disbarment, as 
occurred when Vice Presidential Chief of Staff and Presidential 
Assistant, I. Lewis Libby, was convicted of that crime.76  But between 
social lies and perjury convictions lies vast acreage. 
 
Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that “adultery was conduct involving moral 
turpitude, and, under our law, an infamous crime, since the penalty might be 
imprisonment in the state’s prison. It was indicative of . . .  ‘moral unfitness for the 
profession’ . . . .” Id. at 294.  Having sexual relations with clients, however, is grounds 
for professional discipline in many states. See ABA MODEL RULE PROF’L CONDUCT 
1.8(j) (2012) (“A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a 
consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer 
relationship commenced.”). 
 71. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2012) (“Under 
generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily 
are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the 
subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a 
claim are ordinarily in this category . . . .”). 
 72. See, e.g., In re Clark’s case, 37 A.3d 327 (N.H. 2012) (disbarment appropriate 
for intentionally misleading the Bankruptcy court). 
 73. Orr v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 355 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. 2011) (attorney permanently 
disbarred after forging clients’ names to sell property, fabricating the names of 
people to whom he claimed to have sold property, lying about what he had done, 
converting the money to pay personal debts, and misleading bar investigators); In re 
Bark, 72 So. 3d 853 (La. 2011) (disbarment warranted when lawyer encouraged 
clients and others to invest in his fraudulent scheme); State ex rel. Counsel for 
Discipline of Neb. Sup. Ct. v. Bouda, 806 N.W.2d 879 (Neb. 2011) (lawyer disbarred 
after engaging in an elaborate series of misrepresentations to his client, stealing 
money, and neglecting matters causing a capias to be issued for his client’s arrest). 
 74. See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. 2008) (disbarring lawyer who had 
arranged a job interview for an in-house position with a non-existent corporation for 
a judicial law clerk to convince her to provide evidence the lawyer could use in a 
motion to disqualify judge). 
 75. Zazzali, supra note 27, at 318 (discussing the New Jersey rules that 
permanently disbar lawyers for misappropriating funds). 
 76.  See In re Libby, 945 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 2008) (disbarring I. Lewis (“Scooter”) 
Libby upon conviction for perjury and related crimes). Libby was convicted of 
GREEN&MORIARTY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:47 PM 
160 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
Many lawyers engage in deceit that raises serious concerns about 
fitness to practice: how many lawyers “cheat a little” on their taxes, 
pad their hours “a bit,” or lie to clients about how well the lawyer 
actually performed in hearing when the client was not there?  
Apparently the government collected about three hundred billion 
dollars less in taxes paid than in taxes owed, due to underreporting.77  
Lawyers are undoubtedly represented in this group.  Given that 
nearly all are dishonest to some degree, is there a bright line between 
essentially honest and essentially dishonest?  Although courts seem to 
operate on the assumption of such a bright line, we are less sanguine 
on the subject. 
One theory of why those who consider themselves honest commit 
acts of dishonesty is that they balance the risks and rewards of the 
dishonesty against an internal view of self that is affected by the value 
system around them.78  People’s innate level of honesty can be 
affected by the mores of those with whom they interact.79  Consider 
this slight twist on a social science experiment: If the government left 
pencils on the tables in the courtroom, would you take a few with you 
when you left?  Would you do the same thing if you were at your 
colleague’s desk writing a note?  Would you take a quarter off her 
desk?  While there are many possible answers, we assume that some 
lawyers would take the pencils from the courtroom but would be 
loath to take their colleague’s pencils and would never even consider 
 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006) (providing that perjury is punishable by fine or by 
imprisonment of not greater than five years). See also Matter of Reid, 512 N.Y.S.2d 
114 (App. Div. 1987) (disbarring an attorney upon conviction of perjury in New York 
state court, violating Penal Law § 210.15). 
 77. Mazar et al., supra note 61, at 633. 
 78. Id. at 634. 
 79. Francesca Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: 
The Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 397 (2009) 
(discussing the results of studies to determine the effect of peer influence on 
unethical behavior and finding that a group’s willingness to engage in dishonesty may 
increase when a member of the group to which participants identify commits an act 
of dishonesty); accord ARIELY, supra note 60, at 246 (concluding we “catch” 
dishonesty from others).  Leslie Levin also addresses how peers influence attorneys’ 
ethical norms, exploring the interaction between social psychology and attorney 
discipline. See Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: 
Lessons from Psychology and From Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1549, 1556–59 (2009) (explaining how lawyers’ ethical views are informed by those 
with whom they interact frequently); see also ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK, supra 
note 9; Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Small Firm and Solo Practitioners, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 309, 376–81 (2004) (discussing the relationship between psychological 
processes and ethical practice). 
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taking the money.  Taking something from an identifiable person 
feels like “stealing,” as does filching the quarter.80   
Our conceptions about honesty are also influenced by peers and 
what has become accepted practice.  Many people who are dishonest 
to some degree in paying taxes or puffing up their work-related 
expenses still think of themselves as honest, believing they are doing 
what is socially acceptable,81 akin to “puffing” in negotiations.  Thus, 
our sense of moral behavior is affected by both common practice and 
the moral compasses of those with whom we associate.82  This may 
explain, for example, why some lawyers pad their hours, overbill, or 
double bill.83  According to Professor Ross’s 2006–2007 survey, over 
30% of lawyers who responded double-billed; more than 30% 
“recycled” work from one client and charged the second client; and 
most lawyers believed that padding bills occurs on a regular basis.84  
According to Professor Ross, the number of lawyers engaged in such 
behavior has increased significantly while the number who find the 
behavior morally objectionable has decreased substantially between 
his 1995–1996 survey and the more recent one.85  There is often 
 
 80. See Mazar et al., supra note 61, at 634 (using a related hypothetical). 
 81. Id. at 643. 
 82. See Gino et al., supra note 79, at 397–98; Levin, supra note 79, at 1555–56. 
 83. For discussions of the problem, see, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: 
Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 208, 
208–09 (1999); Douglas R. Richmond, A Few Dollars More: The Perplexing 
Problems of Unethical Billing Practices by Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. REV. 63, 66–67 (2008). 
 84. William G. Ross, Billing Ethics Survey for Attorneys, WILLIAM G. ROSS, 
http://www.williamgeorgeross.com/pdfs/phpESP%20v1%207_with%20omissions%20
for%20posting.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).  Professor Ross notes on his website 
that between the 1995-1996 survey and the 2006-2007 survey, lawyers’ belief that such 
behavior was unethical also decreased. See William G. Ross, Attorney Billing 
Surveys, WILLIAM G. ROSS, http://www.williamgeorgeross.com/surveys.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
 85. Professor Ross concludes about the survey: 
[A]pproximately two-thirds of the respondents to the 2006-07 survey and 
1995-96 surveys stated that they had specific knowledge of bill padding.  
Moreover, the attorneys who responded to the most recent survey seemed, 
on the whole, to be less ethical in their billing practices than those who 
responded to the earlier surveys.  For example, 54.6 percent admitted that 
the prospect of billing additional time had at least sometimes influenced 
their decision to do work that they otherwise would not have performed, 
compared with only 40.3 percent in the 1996 survey.  Similarly, the 
percentage of attorneys who admitted that they had engaged in “double 
billing” rose from 23 percent in 1996-96 to 34.7 percent in 2006-07.  The 
percentage of the attorneys who believed that this practice was unethical fell 
from 64.7 percent in 1995-96 to only 51.8 percent in 2006-07, even though 
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substantial pressure to increase billable hours, and as more lawyers in 
a given firm engage in dishonest behavior, the behavior itself 
becomes more regularized and feels less immoral.  Perhaps lawyers 
are “catching” the cheating bug from their colleagues.86  Research 
suggests that the “ethical climate and ethical culture are important 
predictors of the frequency of unethical acts within groups and 
organizational settings.”87 
With the example of solo practitioners being over-represented in 
the disciplinary system,88 one may theorize that the absence of any 
group to disapprove of improper behavior may be part of the reason 
lawyers can engage in the self-deception necessary to engage in 
professional misconduct.  Since positive peer pressure helps keep 
people honest, perhaps the lack of positive peer pressure negatively 
affects behavior as well. 
For most of us, our conscience, formed in part internally and in 
part by our environment, governs the extent and degree of our 
deceptive behavior.  Most people are neither unnaturally honest nor 
wholly dishonest; we all fall somewhere on a spectrum and various 
factors may affect our behavior, including pressures encountered and 
the perceived risk of detection.  Thus, predicting the likelihood of a 
given individual’s deceptiveness in the future is a complicated and 
possibly futile task. 
There are undoubtedly groups of people who do fall outside of the 
normal range on the deceptive/honest continuum and easily engage in 
serious dishonesty involving vast sums of money or others’ property.  
For example, psychopaths—a very small fraction of the 
population89—routinely engage in deception: “Psychopaths use 
 
this practice has been condemned by the American Bar Association and 
most commentators who have discussed the issue. 
See William G. Ross, Attorney Billing Surveys, WILLIAM G. ROSS, 
http://www.williamgeorgeross.com/surveys.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (emphasis 
added). 
 86. See ARIELY, supra note 60, at 191–216. 
 87. Gino et al., supra note 79, at 397. 
 88. Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of 
Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 847, 847–48 n.3 (2001). 
 89. Psychopathy is generally estimated at roughly one percent of the general 
population. ROBERT D. HARE, Psychopaths and Their Nature: Implications for the 
Mental Health and Criminal Justice Systems, in PSYCHOPATHY:  ANTISOCIAL, 
CRIMINAL, AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 196 (Theodore Millon et al. eds., 1998).  Robert 
Hare, a leading expert on the subject, has defined psychopathy as a “constellation of 
affective, interpersonal, and behavioral characteristics, including egocentricity; 
impulsivity; irresponsibility; shallow emotions; lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse; 
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deception to exploit others . . . , and lie more persistently and 
blatantly, with considerably more panache than do most other 
people.”90  For many years, little research was done on psychopathy in 
the non-violent criminal population.  Few thought psychopaths were 
in the general population, due to their often-extreme behaviors and 
predilection for criminal behavior.  In the last few decades however, 
with the recognition that much white-collar crime and utterly 
unacceptable behavior occurs in business and the professions, there 
has been renewed interest and research in corporate psychopathy.91  
Some of the cases involving disbarment seem to involve such 
manipulative, callous and deceptive behavior that it is reasonable to 
assume that psychopathy (or another serious personality disorder 
involving callous deception) may explain the behavior.  But for many 
cases involving acts resulting in suspension and disbarment, it is quite 
possible the lawyers involved were similar to many lawyers who act 
ethically.  They just made unethically deceptive choices.  
 
pathological lying; manipulativeness; and the persistent violation of social norms and 
expectations.” Id. at 188 (internal citations omitted).  While psychopaths are well-
represented in the violently criminal populations, they are also “well represented in . 
. . swindlers and con artists, mercenaries, corrupt politicians, [and] unethical lawyers 
and doctors.” Id. at 196. See generally THE PSYCHOPATH: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND 
PRACTICE (Hugues Hervé & John C. Yuille eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE 
PSYCHOPATH] (providing a comprehensive review of current research in the study of 
psychopathy). 
Psychopathy has substantial overlap with antisocial personality disorder. See AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR § 301.7 (4th ed. 2000).  There are differences between 
them, however, that are well beyond the scope of this Article.  For a more complete 
explanation of the differences, see Kent A. Kiehl, A Cognitive Neuroscience 
Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for Paralimbic System Dysfunction, 142 
PSYCHIATRY RES. 107, 109 (2006). 
We recognize that other forms of personality disorders and mental illness may 
explain lawyers’ unethical behavior but mention psychopathy due to its accepted 
relation to deception. Barry S. Cooper & John C. Yuille, Psychopathy and 
Deception, in THE PSYCHOPATH, supra at 487–503 (discussing how deception is a 
critical aspect of psychopathy). For more on the various personality disorders and 
mental illnesses that involve deceptive traits, see generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR (4th 
ed. 2000); VRIJ, supra note 60, at 30–34 (discussing the relationship of personality 
types and deception). 
 90. VRIJ, supra note 60, at 31 (citations omitted). 
 91. Paul Babiak, From Darkness Into the Light: Psychopathy in Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology, in THE PSYCHOPATH, supra note 89, at 411–28. 
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It is not just the company lawyers keep that may influence the 
honesty; self-deception may also partially explain lawyer deviance.92  
While humans are good at lying to other people, we seem to also 
excel at lying to ourselves, particularly when the facts conflict with 
our self-perception.93  Self-deception is apparently not a conscious 
process; we may “lack awareness [of] . . . both the contents and 
processes involved.”94  The intriguing concept of self-deception is a 
matter of much debate and discussion among philosophers and 
scientists.95  We all wonder why we would be so capable of lying to 
ourselves about matters small and large but have no conscious 
appreciation for engaging in this behavior. 
We deceive ourselves for various reasons, some positive and some 
not.  More favorable hypotheses “are more pleasant to contemplate 
than unfavorable ones and tend to come more readily to mind”96 and 
most people wish to maintain a positive self-image.97  As Nicholas 
Epley and Erin Whitchurch note, “Flattering information about the 
self is accepted readily, whereas threatening information is evaluated 
more critically and ultimately derogated . . . [which may allow] people 
to form a more desirable image of their traits and abilities than reality 
might allow.”98  These interpretations of self-deception are largely 
 
 92. There are multiple reasons why individuals commit unethically deceptive acts, 
as explained by Professor Abel in LAWYERS IN THE DOCK, supra note 9, and 
Professor Levin in Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers, supra note 79, at 1555 (discussing the 
“various social and psychological processes [that] propel the lawyer down the path to 
deviance”).  Nonetheless, we focus here on two behaviors we believe are critical. 
 93. IAN LESLIE, BORN LIARS: WHY WE CAN’T LIVE WITHOUT DECEIT 185 (2011). 
 94. Ruben C. Gur & Harold A. Sackheim, Self-Deception: A Concept in Search 
of a Phenomenon, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 147, 149 (1979).  While the 
concept of self-deception is much discussed by philosophers and studied by social 
scientists, the concept has not yet been tested by cognitive neuroscientists using fMRI 
methods.  Thus, some argue that self-deception is a just a suggested mechanism that 
removes the troubling thought from consideration but that the existence of this 
mechanism is still unproven. See, e.g., John R. Monterosso & Daniel D. Langleben, 
Homo Economicus’ Soul, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 645, 648–49 (2008) (“We speculate 
that brain activity associated with labeling self-signals as unwanted and keeping them 
from entering awareness may help distinguish self- from other-deception.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 95. Danica Mijovic-Prelec & Drazen Prelec, Self-Deception as Self-Signalling: A 
Model and Experimental Evidence, 365 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. B. 227, 228 (2010) 
(noting that two thousand years of “speculation and commentary have failed to 
exhaust the topic or forge a consensus interpretation”); see also ALFRED R. MELE, 
SELF-DECEPTION UNMASKED (2001); Gur & Sackheim, supra note 94. 
 96. MELE, supra note 95, at 30. 
 97. See Chance et al., supra note 69, at 15655. 
 98.  Nicholas Epley & Erin Whitchurch, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: 
Enhancement in Self-Recognition, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1159, 
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positive and go a long way to allowing us to live among others as 
social animals. 
The role of burnishing our self-image cannot be understated.  
When asked to evaluate their abilities in comparison to peers, all but 
seven percent of college professors believed they were better than 
average at their work.99  These results are replicable throughout the 
populations in the United States; we are Lake Wobegoners, believing 
we are all above average.100  Of course, reality cannot match our 
beliefs, but there are some positive reasons for such widespread self-
deception.  According to some who study mental health, the better-
adjusted see themselves far more positively (and inaccurately) that 
those who are depressed; counter-intuitively, it may be the 
depressives who see the world more accurately.101  Thus, self-
deception is consistent with mental health “because there are positive 
correlations between having these illusions and a positive sense of 
self, satisfying social relationships, caring about others, happiness, the 
ability to set goals and sustain the motivation and persistence to 
achieve them, the ability to cope effectively with setbacks and change, 
and productive, creative work.”102 
Not surprisingly, self-deception is often not so benign, as is clear 
from addiction studies.  A primary problem in treating addiction is 
the failure of most individuals to recognize the need for therapeutic 
help.  In fact, “more than 80% of addicted individuals fail to seek 
treatment.”103  A common explanation for the failure to self-recognize 
addiction is “denial” or self-deception.  Given that many addicts 
suffer terrible consequences as a partial result of self-deception, it 
 
1159 (2008).  In this study, individuals were allowed to select a picture of themselves 
that was accurate or had been morphed to be more attractive or less attractive. Id.  
Participants were more likely to recognize an attractively enhanced version rather 
than their actual photograph. Id.  Interestingly, this enhanced recognition applies to 
close friends but not to strangers. Id. 
 99. See SMITH, supra note 60, at 25 (discussing the oft-cited work of T. GILOVICH, 
HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO (1991)). 
 100. See HARRY C. TRIANDIS, FOOLING OURSELVES: SELF-DECEPTION IN POLITICS, 
RELIGION, AND TERRORISM 45 (2009); see also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY 
IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 182 (rev. & 
expanded ed. 2009) (discussing the “Lake Wobegone effect” of self-deception, also 
known as the positivity bias). 
 101. SMITH, supra note 60, at 27-28. 
 102. TRIANDIS, supra note 100, at 30. 
 103. Rita Z. Goldstein et al., The Neurocircuitry of Impaired Insight in Drug 
Addiction, 13 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 372, 372 (2009). 
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hardly seems like the benign concept described in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
Self-deception has another decidedly dark side that can be used to 
manipulate us into behavior that is harmful to others.104  Lawyers who 
engage in deceptive behavior often employ self-deception to allow 
them to live an unscrupulous life while simultaneously maintaining a 
positive self-image.105  Some social science researchers have termed 
this concept “moral hypocrisy,” where one engages in self-deception 
to “avoid perceiving discrepancies between their self-serving actions 
and their moral standards.”106  The concept of moral hypocrisy—
which operates on an other-than-conscious level—may explain the 
situation of otherwise good lawyers committing bad acts. 
Self-deception is also used in the deception of others.  Shielding 
matters from our conscious mind better shields them from others and 
thus, the deceiver is less likely to exhibit the stress known to 
accompany deception.107  Some theorists posit that deception of 
others is intimately linked to our ability to deceive ourselves.108  
Lawyers may convince themselves that they are really just 
“borrowing” money from their client fund account or that the clients 
from whom they steal are really not very good people.  These lawyers 
use self-deception both to engage in the immoral behavior and to 
deceive others. 
The social science research collectively suggests that when lawyers 
act deceptively, they can convince themselves that the behavior is 
acceptable both by using self-deception and by drawing on the moral 
beliefs of chosen friends and associates.  One could argue that many 
lawyers are not terribly different in kind from those who are 
 
 104. See, e.g., Batson et al., supra note 43, at 525 (discussing how “people who 
sincerely value morality . . . [and value the] interests of others, can act in ways that 
seem to show a blatant disregard for the moral principles they hold dear”).  In this 
study, the authors posit that one way to appear moral to oneself while violating one’s 
morals standards is to engage in self-deception. Accord Roy F. Baumeister & 
Leonard S. Newman, Self-Regulation of Cognitive Inference and Decision Processes, 
20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 3 (1994). 
 105. See Batson et al., supra note 43, at 534–35 (discussing an experiment showing 
how people can act unethically and still maintain a view of themselves as moral).  
Interestingly, this ability was adversely affected by positioning a mirror in front of the 
subjects while they made a choice to be more or less ethical in their decision making. 
Id. at 534.  Apparently, “seeing yourself” as immoral may affect behavior. Id. 
 106. Id. at 525–27. 
 107. See SMITH, supra note 60, at 76 (discussing the work of Robert Trivers). 
 108. Robert Trivers, The Elements of a Scientific Theory of Self-Deception, 907 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 114, 115 (2000). 
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suspended or disbarred; the latter may just have been more able to 
engage in some serious self-deception or are influenced by less-than-
honest companions.109  And social science data suggest various ways 
that we can encourage people to be more honest (at least in 
studies).110 
Perhaps there are ways for judges (and the rest of us) to learn from 
the science.  But what we still do not know—and on which we believe 
that science might provide helpful input—is who will continue to be 
unethically deceptive in the future.  There is a wealth of social science 
and neuroscience that might inform the courts about deceptive 
behavior, yet courts continue on much the way they did in the era of 
Julius Henry Cohen—believing they can accurately judge character 
and that they can predict behavior. 
IV.  CAN SCIENCE IMPROVE JUDICIAL DECISIONS ABOUT 
REINSTATEMENT? 
Once admitted to the bar, there is seemingly an assumption that 
law graduates are and will continue to be honest.111  When disbarred 
or suspended lawyers seek reinstatement, this assumption is no longer 
justified.  Courts must therefore find ways to determine which past 
behaviors are meaningfully correlated with future honesty or future 
dishonesty.  Cognitive and social science knowledge might prove 
helpful to courts. 
In some suspension and disbarment cases, the past deception is so 
extreme as to raise a red flag: stealing large amounts of money from 
clients; forging documents; lying repeatedly to the courts and clients; 
and engaging in complicated forms of deception involving various 
 
 109. We are excluding from this consideration those lawyers whose mental health 
or substance abuse disorders were a primary causative agent in their suspension or 
disbarment.  The effects of altered thinking due to mental illness or substance abuse 
invoke different concerns about rational versus irrational decision making. 
 110. See, e.g., Batson et al., supra note 43, at 534 (requiring people to watch 
themselves in a mirror while acting reduced dishonesty); ARIELY, supra note 60, at 
246–54 (suggesting that reminding people about ethical obligations and making 
subjects responsible for the acts of others reduces dishonesty). 
 111. Professor Barnard has made an intriguing proposal that bar admission ought 
to be a renewable process, with “360 degree reviews” at various points in one’s 
career. Jayne W. Barnard, Renewable Bar Admission: A Template for Making 
“Professionalism” Real, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 1 (2001).  While it is an interesting 
proposal that might well encourage more honest behavior, it seems both complicated 
and unlikely to gain traction with the bar. 
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parties.112  In short, these seriously deceptive acts seem well outside of 
the normal range of dishonesty and deceptiveness.113  The more 
extreme cases may indicate that the lawyer has an underlying 
personality disorder (such as psychopathy) and poses a continuing 
danger to the public if allowed to return to practice.114  Experts on the 
subject (such as psychiatrists) might be helpful in alerting courts 
about individuals with serious personality disorder, but courts seem 
willing to make decisions without the aid of experts, relying largely on 
their own experience and intuition in decisions.  While their native 
practice may be good enough, we believe it might be helpful in 
protecting the public to know more, if that is indeed possible, about 
who is likely to reoffend.  If the public interest is the overarching 
concern when deciding whether to reinstate lawyers, then courts 
should focus on the factors that are meaningfully correlated with 
seriously dishonest behavior. 
The cases involving less egregious behavior also pose equally 
complicated questions related to future behavior: will the lawyer be 
deceptive in future dealings, continue to engage in self-deception so 
as to feel good while doing wrong, and seek out colleagues and 
companions who will encourage (or will not discourage) bad 
behavior?  Answering these questions is far from simple, but courts 
continue to rely on their own experience and intuition, disregarding 
 
 112. There is a range of opinions on what might constitute sufficiently extreme 
behavior.  For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remarked that the crimes 
of misappropriating two million dollars and committing perjury were not so egregious 
as to bar the court from even considering the petition for reinstatement. See In re 
Greenberg, 749 A.2d 434 (Pa. 2000).  The court ultimately declined to readmit 
Greenberg when he sought readmission nine years after disbarment, finding his 
readmission would have a detrimental effect on the standing of the bar and would 
subvert the public interest. Id. at 436.  But curiously, the court did not find the theft 
of two million dollars so egregious as to bar consideration of his petition.  Contrary to 
some courts, however, Pennsylvania at least gives a nod to considering whether the 
severity of the original charge should preclude the court from even considering 
reinstatement. Id. at 438.  Other courts disagree with that backward-look, finding less 
is needed: “A firm resolve to live a correct life evidenced by outward manifestation 
sufficient to convince a reasonable mind clearly that the person has reformed is only 
required. In restoring a disbarred attorney, the principal question is whether that 
particular attorney would be safe to assist in administering justice if readmitted . . . .” 
In re Holt, No. 2011-BR-00600-SCT., 2012 WL 852654, at *2 (Miss. Mar. 15, 2012) 
(quoting Phillips v. Miss. State Bar, 427 So.2d 1380, 1382 (Miss. 1983)). 
 113. Of course, the data on lawyer discipline might change dramatically if more 
lawyers were suspended or disbarred for padding hours. 
 114. David Thornton & Linda Blud, The Influence of Psychopathic Traits on 
Response to Treatment, in THE PSYCHOPATH, supra note 89, at 505 (discussing the 
lack of empirical evidence about successful treatment models). 
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potential insights from science that might be helpful.  Predicting 
future behavior is an exceptionally complex endeavor that even 
experts often get wrong,115 as is clear from the literature about 
predictions of future dangerousness in death penalty hearings and 
cases involving the release of sexual predators.116  Rather than relying 
on intuitive judgment, courts may benefit from empirical data to 
gauge the likelihood of future unethical behavior.117 
Although this Article does not suggest any particular way in which 
courts should proceed, we do believe that gathering data about 
reinstated attorneys might be a useful first step.118  For example, it 
would be helpful to know, at a minimum, how many lawyers who are 
suspended and permitted to return to practice reoffend, and what 
types of original wrongdoing are correlated with future wrongdoing.119  
Perhaps the data will reveal that courts do a good job at weeding out 
re-offenders.  But if we are to take wrongdoing, redemption, and 
protection of the public seriously, we need to know whether the 
methods used by courts to determine fitness to return to practice are 
reliable and valid.120 
 
 115. See Rhode, supra note 13, at 559–60 (discussing experts’ inability to predict 
future behavior with accuracy). 
 116. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 928 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(noting that based upon the opinion of mental health professionals as amici, 
predictions of dangerousness are wrong “two times out of three”).  According to 
social science experts, clinical judgments about predictions of dangerousness are still 
quite poor.  “Little has transpired . . . to increase confidence in the ability of 
psychologists or psychiatrists, using their unstructured clinical judgment, to 
accurately assess violence risk.” John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk 
Assessment:  Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 391, 406 (2006). See generally Richard Rogers & Rebecca L. Jackson, Sexually 
Violent Predators: The Risky Enterprise of Risk Assessment, 44 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 523 (2005) (explaining the complexities and shortcomings of 
attempting to predict which sexually violent predators will reoffend); Christopher 
Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L. J. 275, 283–93 (2006) 
(analyzing, inter alia, the benefits and shortcomings of the various predictive 
methodologies). 
 117. Professor Monahan notes that when experts employ risk assessment 
instruments with multiple predictor variables, their accuracy increases. See Monahan, 
supra note 116, at 409–10. 
 118. For a detailed discussion about the need for better data in law, see Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Judging Science: An Essay on the Unscientific Basis of Beliefs About the 
Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better Data About Law, 14 J.L. 
& POL’Y 137 (2006). 
 119. Data on disciplined lawyers might also be correlated with data on law school 
discipline to see whether there is a relationship between them. 
 120. This is not to say that an empirical study on this issue is not problematic.  
First, the degree of lawyer discipline is far below the rate of lawyer misconduct.  
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As a separate matter, we also wonder whether social science 
discoveries could be helpful to courts in structuring how lawyers 
return to practice.  For example, studies suggest that reminding 
people about their ethical obligations and monitoring their conduct 
may help keep them focused on honest behavior, at least in the short 
term.121  Requiring lawyers to explain their past behavior and account 
for the ethical lapses might be beneficial in preventing future 
unethical and deceptive behavior.122  Courts could also consider 
monitoring the behavior of reinstated lawyers through the use of a 
mentoring system, where reinstated lawyers and an assigned mentor 
must check in with the court on a regular schedule.123  Many people in 
addiction recovery make use of sponsors to assure continued sobriety 
and compliance with sobriety programs.  Those with serious mental 
illnesses are often required to have periodic consultations with 
physicians to assure compliance with medication regimes.  In the 
criminal justice system, the use of long probationary terms is common 
upon release from prison.124  The obligation to meet with a monitor on 
a regular basis may help to ensure continuing good behavior.  We do 
not endorse any of these findings but only offer these insights that 
could be helpful to courts. 
We do not mean to suggest, however, that cognitive and social 
science provide a panacea for the disciplinary system.  On the 
contrary, there is much disagreement about the proper role of science 
 
Second, lawyers who have a prior suspension or disbarment may not be treated the 
same as other lawyers—even small examples of misconduct may generate a greater 
response from disciplinary authorities than is the norm.  Third, there is no real way to 
evaluate courts’ decisions to prevent disbarred or suspended lawyers from returning 
to the practice, as that group will be outside the purview of the disciplinary system.  
Finally, there will always be problems and disputes around both the accuracy of the 
data collection and the meaningful analysis of that data that are common to all such 
endeavors. 
 121. ARIELY, supra note 60, at 39–53 (discussing the prophylactic role ethics 
reminders have in reducing cheating on tests, but noting their often short-term 
effect). 
 122. Batson et al., supra note 43, at 529 (claiming that by making individuals more 
self-aware—such as being called upon in public to account for one’s behavior—can 
“heighten awareness of discrepancies between behavior and salient personal 
standards, creating pressure to act in accord with standards”). 
 123. Professor Barnard’s concept of the “systematic periodic performance 
evaluation” for all lawyers dovetails with the concept of monitoring lawyers who 
have already been in trouble. See Barnard, supra note 111. 
 124. In the federal criminal system, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) mandates terms of one to 
five years for monitored probation after sentences are concluded. 18 U.S.C.A. § 
3583(b) (West 2013); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1 (2004) 
(sentencing guidelines that suggest long monitored probation after release). 
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in the courts.125  Scientific discoveries are often the product of small 
laboratory studies that hold little meaning for application outside the 
lab.  They may be plagued by small sample size, poorly designed 
experiments, questionable statistical analysis, or conclusions that 
constitute an unwarranted leap from the data generated.  Moreover, 
there is often disagreement among the scientists themselves about the 
proper use of social science data in the court system,126 and reliance 
on social science risks the possibility of “reducing human beings to 
data points.”127  However, we do think there is something to be 
learned from those who study behavior and that such knowledge 
might be helpful to courts in deciding whether to reinstate lawyers.128 
V.  WHY DOES THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH PERSIST WITHOUT 
REGARD TO POTENTIAL SOCIAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS? 
In recent decades, courts have drawn on social science 
understandings and methodologies in a wide variety of contexts.  
Science-based experts testify to assist both judges and juries in 
making a host of decisions in both civil and criminal trials.129  The 
 
 125. For a small sample of the literature, see generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL 
ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999); ROBIN FELDMAN, 
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995); and Susan Haack, Irreconcilable 
Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1 (2009). 
 126. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) 
(providing a contemporary example where scientists disagreed about the proper use 
of social science in the courtroom).  For an explanation of some aspects of the 
disagreement, see generally Gregory Mitchell et al., Beyond Context: Social Facts as 
Case-Specific Evidence, 60 EMORY L. J. 1109 (2011). 
 127. FELDMAN, supra note 125, at 151–52. 
 128. We expressly do not suggest any particular method for courts to become 
acquainted with this social science learning.  We simply submit that perhaps science 
can be a helpful adjuvant to courts making these difficult decisions. 
 129. Scientific evidence has become a prominent aspect of civil and criminal trials 
in the twenty years since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was decided. 
509 U.S. 529 (1993).  For one commentator’s discussion of some aspects of this 
change, see, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and 
Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661 (2000) (discussing the revolutionary change in science and 
law following the Supreme Courts’ trilogy on expert evidence).  The use of social 
science in legal decision making, however, certainly is not without controversy.  See, 
e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 125, at 148–52 (discussing the shortcomings of the 
Supreme Court’s reliance upon and understanding of science in its decisions); Rachel 
F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social Science, and 
The Law, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 (2010) (discussing the debate over the use of 
social science in Brown v. Board of Education, 498 U.S. 483 (1954), and the 
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United States Supreme Court has relied on various forms of science 
in reaching decisions over the last several decades.130  But science is 
largely not a part of the design of the disciplinary (including 
reinstatement and readmission) process.  Lawyers seeking to mitigate 
their punishment or seeking to reenter the profession do sometimes 
offer evidence from psychologists but generally in the limited role to 
explain recovery and treatment from substance abuse or mental 
health disorders.131  With that exception, science is largely absent. 
Focusing on lawyers who engage in deceit, we have shown that the 
various forms of scientific knowledge might offer insights.  Tools 
might be offered to identify lawyers with serious personality and 
other disorders who plainly should not be reinstated or readmitted 
because they cannot be trusted at all to adhere to professional norms.  
More generally, the experts might offer insights into why offending 
lawyers act dishonestly in given situations, how the thought-process of 
those lawyers may differ from that of others, how those thought 
processes would have to change to provide greater confidence that 
they will act honestly in the future, and how that change might be 
achieved and identified.   
We are not prescribing the use of any particular tools or suggesting 
that courts should draw on any particular insights or how those 
insights might change courts’ inquiry.  The point is simply that 
scientific knowledge likely has something to offer from which courts 
have not tried to benefit.  One might ask, why not?  We offer the 
following speculation. 
There are many reasons why courts might adhere to an approach 
that predates the development of the social sciences.  One is that law 
 
continuing concerns about the use of social science in the courtroom); see also 
Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the Courts: The Role of Amicus Briefs, 15 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1991). 
 130. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–74 (2005) (relying in part on 
scientific and sociological data to support its holding that imposing the death penalty 
on individuals who committed crimes while juveniles is unconstitutional); General 
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring and noting the 
increase in “cases presenting significant science-related issues”); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954) (relying on social science evidence that 
segregation had a negative psychological impact on African American children).  The 
research upon which the Court relied in Brown has been widely critiqued. FELDMAN, 
supra note 125, at 149–50. 
 131. See Timothy P. Chinaris, Even Judges Don’t Know Everything: A Call for 
Presumption of Admissibility for Expert Witness Testimony in Lawyer Disciplinary 
Proceedings, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 825, 828 n.6 (2005) (collecting cases and noting that a 
common use of experts is to address health and addiction matters). 
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practice is innately conservative and slow to change, particularly 
absent some good reason to do so.  Concepts such as stare decisis 
speak to the strength of inertia when it comes to the development of 
the law and legal institutions.  There is a powerful force favoring the 
preservation of concepts such as “character” that are deeply rooted in 
the admissions and disciplinary jurisprudence.  Courts may be aware, 
on some level, that a foray into social science literature opens the 
door to questioning the idea of “character” as a predictor of lawyers’ 
future behavior.  Courts’ indifference to cognitive and social science 
may simply bespeak resistance to change in this area.132 
A second possibility is that the traditional common-law approach 
to post-disciplinary proceedings more easily allows courts to mask 
political considerations that they believe to be important to their 
decisions.  Courts are sometimes explicit about political 
considerations that enter into their decision making—e.g., that public 
confidence in the legal profession sometimes precludes readmission 
of disbarred lawyers with demonstrable good character because of the 
nature of their prior wrongs—but they may often prefer to be opaque 
about their reasoning.  An approach predicated on social science 
literature might give too much weight, or even a dispositive role, to 
the question of whether the applicant is or is not likely to engage in 
future wrongdoing, without adequate regard to other considerations 
that courts would rather hide. 
Finally, two other possible explanations bring us back to Julius 
Henry Cohen and his conception of the central role of professional 
discipline in preserving law as a “profession.”   
First, the idea of “character” is not simply old and venerable.  It is 
also an idea intrinsic to Cohen’s conception of law as a profession.  
The idea is that people are either honest or dishonest, trustworthy or 
untrustworthy, law-abiding or lawless; that our character predicts our 
conduct; and that the admissions and disciplinary processes will, for 
the most part successfully, weed out the dishonest, untrustworthy, and 
 
 132. Courts’ adherence to long-established practice may also reflect judicial belief 
that determining rehabilitation is not a terribly complex decision and is one that 
judges can make based upon common sense.  This intuitive style of decision-making 
seems not to recognize the complexity of the judgments that courts must make in this 
situation.  For more on intuitive judicial decision-making, see Jane Campbell 
Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude? The NAS Report and the Role of the Judiciary, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 299, 317–19 (discussing, inter alia, judges’ intuitive decision-
making in deciding certain types of evidentiary issues); and Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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lawless among us.  Part of what defines lawyers as professionals is the 
presumption that, as a result of this process, they possess good 
character and that clients can trust them with their valuables and 
courts can take them at their word.  Social science literature 
potentially threatens that core idea in various ways, particularly by 
exposing the fact that people are not good or bad but mostly a little of 
both, and by showing that, to the extent distinctions of moral 
character do exist, we and our institutions are not very good at 
recognizing them. 
What would follow from conceding these possibilities and 
reconstructing disciplinary processes around them?  The lawyer 
monopoly is predicated in part on the presumption that lawyers, as 
professionals, are generally more honest, trustworthy and law-abiding 
than others, and in part on the presumption that lawyers have 
superior skill, knowledge and expertise relevant to the law.  If one 
assumes that lawyers from a moral perspective are just a cross-section 
of humanity, half the premise for the lawyer monopoly disappears or 
weakens. 
Second, judicial control over the lawyer regulatory process is 
predicated on the assumption that lawyers (including judges) are 
uniquely capable of policing themselves.  This is because lawyers have 
a better understanding of what law practice entails and, presumably, a 
better ability to discern who has the requisite attributes.  As to legal 
skill and knowledge, that may be true.  It is unlikely that judges and 
lawyers can claim an ability superior to non-lawyers to assess the 
“character” of applicants to the bar and of lawyers caught up in the 
disciplinary process or to assess the personal traits for which the 
concept of “character” may serve as a proxy.  If one concedes that 
social scientists are better than lawyers at fashioning a methodology 
for determining which would-be lawyers are likely to act honestly in 
professional dealings, at understanding why lawyers deviate, or at 
identifying the situations in which lawyers are likely to deviate, the 
premise of lawyer control over lawyer discipline weakens.  If Cohen is 
right, as discipline goes, so goes the profession. 
This is not to suggest that judicial control and social science input 
are necessarily inconsistent.  Judges can draw on social science 
insights in the disciplinary process without necessarily ceding control, 
just as they draw on social science expertise in other contexts.  
However, as we suggested earlier, there are mysteries at the heart of 
the disciplinary process—the determination of who has been 
rehabilitated being chief among them.  The more these become 
governed by deliberative processes informed by the social scientists 
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and the less by intuitive, somewhat hidden decision making, the less 
mysterious and more accessible they become, the more obvious the 
courts’ limitations and fallibility become, and the weaker becomes the 
bar’s claim to exclusive authority.133 
In other words, Cohen was on to something when he stressed the 
importance of the reciprocal relationship between professional 
regulation and the preservation of the legal profession.  
Reinstatement and readmission are just a small part of the regulatory 
process, which includes admission, rulemaking and—the title of his 
first chapter134—disbarment.  But as we have shown, these small parts 
of the process provide a window into the understanding of lawyer 
regulation and professionalism.  The courts’ adherence to the 
potentially outmoded concept of “character” and methods of 
discerning it in the contexts of reinstatement and readmission, and 
perhaps more broadly, their indifference to possible alternative 
approaches offered by the social sciences, may be rooted, at least in 
part, in the interest in preserving the idea of law as a profession in the 
face of perennial challenges posed in the twenty-first century no less 
than in Cohen’s day. 
 
 133. For a challenge to the traditional claim, see Jonathan Macey, Occupation 
Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation and the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1079, 1079–82 (2005) (“[W]hatever value self-regulation may have had 
historically, the legal profession and clients would benefit from abandoning it . . . .”). 
 134. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 1. 
